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Abstract 
We use an innovative methodology to measure management practices in over 300 manufacturing 
firms in the UK. We then match this management data to production and energy usage information for 
establishments owned by these firms. We find that establishments in better managed firms are 
significantly less energy intensive. They use less energy per unit of output, and also in relation to 
other factor inputs. This is quantitatively substantial: going from the 25th to the 75th percentile of 
management practices is associated with a 17.4% reduction in energy intensity. This negative 
relationship is robust to a variety of controls for industry, location, technology and other factor inputs. 
Better managed firms are also significantly more productive. One interpretation of these results is that 
well managed firms are adopting modern lean manufacturing practices, which allows them to increase 
productivity by using energy more efficiently. This suggests that improving the management practices 
of manufacturing firms may help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing literature is pointing to differences in management practices as an important factor in 
explaining variations in productivity across firms and countries1. In this paper, we examine how the 
quality of management relates to the energy intensity of firms, a key driver of the greenhouse gas and 
pollution levels. The theoretical relationship between management practices and energy intensity is a 
priori ambiguous. On the one hand, better managed firms should be able to reduce energy use through 
more efficient production techniques. On the other hand, the higher productivity that good management 
involves may also require greater capital utilization, and potentially higher energy usage. In this paper 
we assemble the first data set on management practices and energy intensity to investigate this 
relationship. 
 
Based on cross country data, it appears that better management practices are associated with greater 
energy intensity. Figure 1 plots the CO2 pollution intensity across fifteen countries against the average 
quality of management (based on the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) methodology and described in 
section 2 below), showing an apparently positive correlation, suggesting that well managed firms may 
pollute more. Particularly notable in this context is the performance of the US being a top ranked in 
both managerial quality and energy intensity. Of course a number of other variables, such as the level 
of regulation or industrial development, also differ across these countries, which may induce a spurious 
correlation between management practices and pollution. Hence, to examine this correlation more 
carefully it is important to look across firms within a particular country, thereby holding constant those 
common country-wide factors.  
 
In this paper we match firm-level information on management practices to production and energy 
usage data from the UK business census for the establishments owned by these firms. The energy 
usage data from the census allows us to undertake the first evaluation of the firm level association 
between management practices and energy utilization. We find a robust negative correlation between 
management practices and energy intensity. In other words, better managed firms are less energy 
intensive, which as we discuss in Section 3 is robust to a large number of additional controls. Figure 2 
plots this cross firm scatter plot of management practices against energy intensity showing a significant 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prenushi (1997), Black and Lynch (2001), Cappelli and Neumark (2001), 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007), Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and Bloom, Sadun and 
Van Reenen (2007). 
Figure 1: CO2 Pollution Intensity and Management Practices Across Countries 
China
France
Germany
Greece
India
Italy
Japan
Poland
Portugal Sweden
UK
US
Brazil
Ireland
Canada
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
C
O
2 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 (k
g)
2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4
Management Score  
Notes: Data from the International Energy Agency and CEP management survey data. Horizontal axis reports 
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Figure 2: Energy intensity and management at the firm level (UK firms only) 
-2
-1
0
1
2
En
er
gy
 In
te
ns
ity
 (l
og
 d
ev
ia
tio
ns
 fr
om
 in
du
st
ry
 a
ve
ra
ge
)
-2 -1 0 1 2
Management Score (log deviations from industry average)  
Notes: Data from census of production (ARD) and CEP management survey. The graph shows a scatter plot of the 
residuals of a regression of energy intensity on industry sector binary indicators on the residuals of a regression of 
the management score on the same industry binary indicators. 
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negative correlation. Hence, this suggests that the positive cross-country correlation between energy 
intensity and better management is misleading, as it is driven by spurious correlations with other 
factors, such as the level of development. The magnitude of this negative cross-firm management 
correlation with energy intensity is quantitatively substantial. Improving management practices from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile is associated with a 17.4% reduction in energy intensity.  
 
We also investigate the link between management practices and productivity, finding a strong positive 
correlation: improving the quality of management from the 25th to 75th percentile is associated with a 
3.7% increase in total-factor productivity. Therefore, overall these results suggest that management 
practices that are associated with improved productivity are not linked to worse environmental 
performance. Rather, our results are broadly supportive of the idea that well run firms use energy 
inputs more efficiently, thereby increasing profitability and productivity, while at the same time 
reducing carbon emissions. We also find better managed firms use less materials in their production 
process, but more physical capital and more skilled labor. 
 
A question that arises from our results is what could drive the negative correlation between energy 
intensity, management and economic performance in our firms? One explanation is that modern 
management practices minimize energy use. For example, Lean manufacturing, which is a widely 
adopted modern management technology developed by Toyota in the 1960s and 1970s, explicitly tries 
to reduce the waste of materials and energy.2 Another explanation is that the factors which induce firms 
to improve their management practices – like tougher product market competition or improved 
corporate governance – may also induce them to be more energy efficient in order to cut production 
costs. 
 
Our results suggest that policies aimed at improving management practices – such as encouraging 
competition, reducing labor-market regulations and eliminating tax-incentives for family ownership – 
may improve environmental outcomes.3 One example supporting this concept is the staggering energy 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Womack et al. (1990). 
3 Of course the results might equally entail that environmental policies lead targeting firms lead to improvements in 
economic performance, for example Berman and Bui (2001) or Shadbegian and Gray (2005) and somewhat contrary, 
Greenstone (2002).  
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inefficiency of the (old) Soviet block factories. These firms did not face product market competition, so 
had little incentive to economize on energy use. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the two data sources used 
for this study. The third section provides the results and counterfactual analysis, whereas the last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The data used for the analysis is drawn from two different sources. The first source is the management 
survey conducted by the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics during 
the summer of 2006. This includes eighteen questions from which the overall management source is 
computed plus additional information on firms’ characteristics and the interview process. The second 
source is the Census of Production data from the UK Office of National Statistics, which provides 
detailed information on establishments’ production inputs. 
2.1 Management Data 
Overall, we surveyed almost 6,000 firms across 15 countries. Although in this paper we use only 
information on UK firms, in this section we describe the three key steps in collecting informative 
management practice data from firms across all countries. 
 
Scoring Management Practices 
First, to measure management requires codifying the concept of “good” or “bad” management into a 
measure applicable to different firms across the manufacturing sector. This is a challenging task as 
good management is difficult to define and is often contingent on a firm’s environment. Our initial 
hypothesis was that, while characterizing every managerial practice as “good” or “bad” was extremely 
hard, there is a subset of practices that are common across manufacturing firms and for which such a 
characterization is informative. Our survey questions focus on such practices, and is built from a 
practice evaluation tool developed by a leading international management consultancy firm.  
 
Our survey evaluation tool defines eighteen key management practices used by industrial firms and 
scores them from one (worst practice) to five (best practice). In Appendix A (Table A1) we detail these 
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practices and the type of questions we asked in the same order as they appeared in the survey. Bloom 
and Van Reenen (2006) gives examples and more details on these practices.  
 
These practices are grouped into four areas: operations (three practices), monitoring (five practices), 
targets (five practices) and incentives (five practices). The shop-floor operations section focuses on the 
introduction of lean manufacturing techniques, the documentation of processes improvements and the 
rationale behind the introduction of such improvements. The monitoring section focuses on the 
tracking of performance of individuals, reviewing performance (e.g. through regular appraisals and job 
plans), and consequence management (e.g. making sure that plans are kept and appropriate sanctions 
and rewards are in place). The targets section examines the type of targets (whether goals are simply 
financial or operational or more holistic), the realism of the targets (stretching, unrealistic or non-
binding), the transparency of targets (simple or complex) and the range and interconnection of targets 
(e.g. whether they are given consistently throughout the organization). Finally, the incentives section 
includes promotion criteria (e.g. purely tenure based or including an element linked to individual 
performance), pay and bonuses, and fixing or firing bad performers, where best practice is deemed the 
approach that gives strong rewards for those with both ability and effort. A subset of the practices has 
similarities with those used in studies on Human Resource Management practices literature such as 
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prenushi (1997), Black and Lynch (2001) and Cappelli and Neumark (2001). 
 
In our main econometric specifications we take the unweighted average across the scores as our 
primary measure of overall managerial quality. We also experimented with other weighting schemes 
based on factor analytic approaches, but none of our results changed in any fundamental way.  
 
Collecting Accurate Responses 
A second challenge is to obtain unbiased responses to these questions. The survey instrument was 
targeted at plant managers, who are typically senior enough to have an overview of management 
practices but not senior enough as to be detached from day-to-day operations of the enterprise. To 
obtain accurate information, we used a double-blind survey methodology. This consisted of two steps. 
First, the interviews were conducted by telephone without revealing to the managers that they were 
being scored. This enabled scoring to be based on the interviewer’s evaluation of the firm’s actual 
practices, rather than their aspirations, the manager’s perceptions or the interviewer’s impressions. 
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Interviewers were specifically instructed to use open (i.e. “can you tell me how you promote your 
employees?”), rather than closed questions (i.e. “do you promote your employees on tenure 
[yes/no]?”). Furthermore, these questions targeted actual practices and examples, with the discussion 
continuing until the interviewer could make an accurate assessment of the firm’s typical practices 
based on these examples. For each practice, the first question was broad and it was followed by 
detailed questions to fine-tune the scoring. For example, regarding the introduction of modern 
manufacturing practices, the initial question was: “Can you tell me about your manufacturing process?” 
and was followed by the more specific question: “How do you manage your inventory levels?”.  
 
The second step of the double-blind scoring methodology was that the interviewers did not know 
anything about the firm’s financial information or performance in advance of the interview. This was 
achieved by selecting medium sized manufacturing firms and by providing only firm names and 
contact details to the interviewers (but no financial details). These smaller firms (the median size was 
275 employees) would not be known by name and are rarely reported in the business media. The 
interviewers were specially trained graduate students from top European and U.S. business schools. All 
interviews were conducted in English. 
 
Since each interviewer ran 85 interviews, on average, we can remove interviewer fixed effects from all 
empirical specifications. This helps to address concerns over inconsistent interpretation of categorical 
responses (see Manski, 2004), standardizing the scoring system. As an additional control for any 
residual potential survey noise, we collected detailed information on the interview process itself 
(number and type of prior contacts before obtaining the interviews, duration, time-of-day, date and day-
of-the week), on the manager (gender, seniority, nationality, company and job tenure, internal and 
external employment experience and location). We refer to these variables as “noise controls”, since 
their inclusion should help us control for measurement error. 
 
Obtaining Interviews with Managers 
Each interview took on average forty five minutes and was run during the summers of 2006 to 2008 
from the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics. Overall, we obtained 
a relatively high response rate of 45%, which was achieved through four steps. First, the interview was 
introduced as “a piece of work” without discussion of the firm’s financial position or its company 
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accounts, making it relatively uncontroversial for managers to participate. Interviewers did not discuss 
financials in the interviews, both to maximize the participation of firms but also to ensure our 
interviewers were truly “blind” on the firm’s financial position. Also the fact that the questions were 
focused on firm’s managerial practices meant that many managers, besides the plant manager, could be 
contacted4.  Second, practices were ordered to lead with the least controversial (shop-floor operations 
management) and finish with the most controversial (pay, promotions and firings). Third, interviewers’ 
performance was closely monitored and explicitly incentivised. On the one hand, each team of 
interviewers (two or three persons) had a dedicated supervisor, providing on-the-spot training and 
advice, but also double-scoring most of the interviews conducted. On the other hand, interviewers’ 
compensation was per interview conducted and there were also bonus payments on reaching team 
goals. These efforts led interviewers to be persistent when chasing any particular firm. Fourth, the 
written endorsement of the Governments, Central Banks and Employer Federations across the countries 
interviewed helped demonstrate to managers that this was an important exercise with official support.  
 
We focused on medium sized manufacturing firms, randomly selecting firms with between 100 and 
5,000 employees. Comparing the responding firms with those in the sampling frame, we found no 
evidence that the responders were systematically different on any of the performance measures to the 
non-responders. The only exception was on size, where our firms were slightly larger on average than 
those in the sampling frame. 
 
The average management scores for the fifteen countries we interviewed are plotted in Figure 1 against 
the average level of CO2 produced per capita. The management scores are highest for the US, Canada 
and the traditional manufacturing countries like Germany, Japan and Sweden, intermediate for 
Northern Europe (UK, France, Italy and Poland) and low for Southern Europe and developing 
countries (Portugal, Greece, India, Brazil and China). The ordering for CO2 produced per capita is very 
similar, leading to a positive cross-country correlation between management practices and per capita 
energy use. 
 
 
                                                 
4 We found no significant correlation between the number, type and time-span of contacts before an interview is conducted 
and the management score. This suggests while different managers may respond differently to the interview proposition, 
this does not appear to be directly correlated with their responses or the average management practices of the firm. 
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2.2 Census of Production Data 
The UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) maintains a register of all businesses in Britain called the 
Interdepartmental Business Register (IDBR). On the basis of this register the ONS runs a mandatory 
survey of UK businesses, the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI).5 Our firm level production data, the 
Annual Respondents Database (ARD), is derived from this survey.6 The ARD focuses mostly on 
medium and large firms, whereas smaller businesses with less than 250 employees are not surveyed 
every year but included into the sample on a random basis. The ARD sampled plants account for 
around 90% of total manufacturing employment in the UK.  
 
Matching the Census of Production data to the Management Survey data 
The CEP management survey provides data on 601 plants in Britain. Around 338 of these could be 
matched to the census production data. The match is not complete because the system of Company 
Register Numbers (CRN), which is the basis for the management survey, is maintained independently 
from the businesses registry that the production census is based upon. Although the ONS provides a 
lookup table between the two registers, there are a number of firms surveyed on their managerial 
practices that could not be matched to the production census. This is typically the case for smaller, less 
established firms. 
 
Table B1 in the appendix reports descriptive statistics for the two samples of matched and un-matched 
firms. In terms of employment, matched firms have on average about 84 employees more than un-
matched firms. They are also slightly older and have a higher management score. To the extent that this 
sample selection affects our results, we expect that it would introduce a downward bias by compressing 
the range of variation of firm performance (reducing the signal to noise ratio in the data). Appendix B 
provides further details of the matching process.  
 
Because of stratified random sampling of smaller firms in the ARD7, we do not have production data 
for every firm in every year. Table 1 reports statistics on the firms we can use for productivity and 
                                                 
5 Descriptions of the ABI can be found in Griffith (1999) and Criscuolo, Haskel and Martin (2003). 
6 This survey is the UK equivalent of the US Longitudinal Respondents Database (LRD). 
7 Firms with less than 250 employees are included on a random basis in the ARD whereas larger firms are sampled every 
year. 
  
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Mean Standard Deviation Percentiles Mean by Quartile of Management 
   25th 75th 1st 2nd 3d 4th 
Management 3.061 0.641 2.655 3.495 2.263 2.901 3.306 3.894 
Energy expenditure 
over gross output 
(EE/GO) % 
1.744 2.026 0.748 2.045 1.787 1.606 1.675 1.728 
Employment 407 456 161 480 267 389 478 473 
Energy expenditure 
(1000s of £) 1011 1950 146 879 563 729 1419 1334 
 
Notes: The above table provides summary statistics on some of the key variables of the matched census of production 
and management survey firm level data. Columns 5 to 8 report the means across quartiles of the management score 
distribution. For example, column 5 provides the average energy intensity (in row 2) of firms in the bottom quartile of the 
management score distribution. Statistics are based on 1046 observations from 272 firms across the years 1999 to 2004. 
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energy intensity. In total we are able to use 1,046 observations corresponding to 272 firms between 
1999 (first year with energy expenditure data) and 2004 (last available wave of the ARD). 
3. Results  
Our results are discussed in three parts. First, as a basic check on the data we confirm that our firm-
level management measure is significantly related to establishment level productivity, mirroring the 
results of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). Second, we provide evidence showing that managerial 
quality is significantly related to lower levels of energy intensity. In other words, we demonstrate that 
the best managed firms are not only more productive, but also more efficient consumers of energy. 
Finally, we examine how management is related to the intensity in other production factors. 
 
3.1 Management practices and Productivity 
Consider the basic firm production function:  
 
ititiiteitinitkitlit uZMeinklgo ++++++= 'γβαααα     (1) 
 
where GO = real gross output (sales and inventory changes deflated with a sectoral producer price 
index), L = labor, K = capital, IN = deflated expenditure on non-energy intermediate inputs (materials) 
and E = deflated energy expenditure of firm i at time t. Lower case letters denote natural logarithms, 
e.g. l = ln(L). The matrix Z consists of a number of control variables that affect productivity, such as 
workforce characteristics8 (the proportion of workers with a degree and the average hours worked), 
firm characteristics (firm age, whether the firm is listed), and a complete set of three digits industry 
binary indicators.  
 
The crucial variable for us is management practices denoted by M. Our basic measure averages the 
eighteen individual management practices as a proxy for M. We experimented with a number of other 
approaches, such as using the primary factor, and found very similar results.  
 
                                                 
8 We experimented with a wide range of workforce characteristics such as gender, worker age, education and unionization, 
finding our results robust to these additional controls. 
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The most straightforward approach to estimating equation (1) is to simply run OLS on the panel with 
standard errors clustered by firm and assume that all the correlated heterogeneity is captured by the 
control variables.9 Table 2 investigates the association between firm performance and management 
practices. Column 1 simply reports an OLS specification controlling only for year and industry fixed 
effects. The management score is strongly positively and significantly associated with higher labor 
productivity (coefficient 0.490, standard error 0.093). In column 2 we introduce our additional “noise 
controls”, regional controls and firm characteristics. In line with our expectations these additional 
control variables reduce the measurement error in the management score and as a result the coefficient 
on management increases to 0.531 and is significant at the 1% level. In the rest of the table we 
introduce progressively more information on the other production factors. In column 3 we control for 
labor, whereas in columns 4 we also introduce capital, energy and materials controls. In column 5 we 
control for workforce skills as well. The coefficient on management, although diminishing in value, is 
always positive and significant at 0.044. The economic magnitude of this effect is also substantial: 
improving the quality of management from the 25th to 75th percentile (ΔM=0.840 from Table 1) is 
associated with a 3.7% (=0.044×0.840) increase in total-factor productivity. These results parallel the 
findings of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) indicating a positive and strong association between firm 
level management practices and establishment-level total factor productivity (TFP) across firms in four 
countries. 
 
3.2 Management practices and Energy Intensity 
Before analysing econometrically the relationship between managerial quality and energy intensity, it 
is informative to look at the raw distribution non-parametrically. Figure 3 plots the kernel density of 
energy expenditure over gross output for the best managed (top quartile) versus the worst (bottom 
quartile) managed firms. Two key facts become evident from this graph. First, there are more well 
managed firms that consume energy less intensively (“fatter” left tail of the distribution), and second, 
their whole distribution is to the left of that of the worst managed firms, indicating lower energy 
intensity overall. 
 
                                                 
9 A large literature is concerned with endogeneity and biases in this kind of regression (see Griliches Mairesse 1996 for a 
summary.) We examine the robustness of our main results with respect to issue by implementing a control function 
approach (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin 2003; Martin, 2008). These results are available on request. 
  
 
Table 2 - Management Practices and Productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  log (Gross Output) 
Management 0.490*** 0.531*** 0.128** 0.043** 0.044** 
 (0.093) (0.101) (0.059) (0.021) (0.020) 
Labor   1.035*** 0.243*** 0.247*** 
log (number workers)   (0.048) (0.029) (0.028) 
Capital    0.084*** 0.084*** 
log (capital stock)    (0.023) (0.021) 
Materials - Energy     0.654*** 0.651*** 
log (material - energy expenditure)    (0.035) (0.034) 
Energy    0.029 0.027 
log (energy expenditure)    (0.019) (0.018) 
Share of High Skilled     0.017** 
log (share of employees with degree)         (0.008) 
Three digit sector controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Age controls no yes yes yes yes 
Noise controls no yes yes yes yes 
Region controls no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 
Firms 272 272 272 272 272 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on census production (ARD) and CEP management survey data. 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of gross output. All columns include a full set of year binary 
indicators. “Management” is the average scores across the eighteen questions on management practices from the CEP 
management survey; output and factor input variables (labor, capital, materials, energy) are from the census production data 
(ARD). Noise controls are a set of variables capturing interview characteristics: duration and time of the interview, the gender of 
the interviewee, the reliability and competence of the interviewee as perceived by the interviewer and binary indicators for each 
interviewer. Standard errors clustered at the firm level (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) 
are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 29
Figure 3: Management Practices and Energy Intensity 
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plots of (the logistic transformation of) energy expenditure over gross output for the sample of firms with management 
score in the bottom quartile (badly managed) and the top quartile (well managed) 
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To investigate the relationship between management practices and energy intensity of production in 
more detail, we consider the following specification: 
 
( ) ititiitkitlitinit uZMklgoGOEE +++++=× '100/ γβααα     (2) 
 
where EE/GO×100 = energy expenditure over gross output in percentage terms, GO = gross output 
(sales and inventory changes), L = labor, K = capital, and M = our management practices score for firm 
i at time t. Lower case letters again denote natural logarithms, e.g. l = ln(L). The matrix Z consists of a 
number of control variables that affect productivity, such as workforce characteristics (the proportion 
of workers with a degree), firm characteristics (firm age), and a complete set of three digits industry 
binary indicators.  
 
Table 3 reports the results from this specification. Column 1 simply regresses energy intensity – 
defined as the energy share of gross-output – on management practices, controlling for year and 
industry differences. The management coefficient is strongly negative and significant, indicating that 
well managed firms consume energy more efficiently given their level of output. In column 2 the 
introduction of our “noise controls” and firm characteristics renders the management coefficient 
stronger and more statistically significant. In column 3 we introduce (log) gross output to control for 
possible scale effects. The coefficient on gross output is negative which is consistent with scale effects 
– i.e. larger firms requiring less energy per unit of output – but not significant. The coefficient on 
management reduces slightly from –0.394 to –0.326 but is still significant. In columns 4 to 6 we 
experiment using labour and capital as proxies for size. The management coefficient is not significantly 
affected by their inclusion although its point estimate is somewhat larger than in column 3.  
 
In columns 7 and 8 we re-introduce gross output. Once both gross output and employment or capital 
are introduced, the former becomes significantly negative, whereas capital and labour become positive, 
although not significant. This suggests that there are two opposing effects. On the one hand, there is a 
scale effect: larger output means that energy intensity reduces (there appear to be energy “economies of 
scale”). On the other hand, more labour or capital intensive firms require more energy. However, 
irrespective of this heterogeneity, better managed firms are always significantly less energy intensive. 
The economic magnitude of these coefficients is large. For example, the coefficient of -0.362 in 
  
 
Table 3 - Management Practices and Energy Intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Energy Expenditure over gross output (EE/GO x 100) 
Management -0.225** -0.394** -0.326** -0.351** -0.375** -0.365** -0.361** -0.362** -0.370** 
 (0.113) (0.154) (0.161) (0.160) (0.171) (0.171) (0.168) (0.167) (0.167) 
Gross output   -0.127    -0.336** -0.359* -0.387** 
log (gross output)   (0.109)    (0.164) (0.197) (0.193) 
Labor    -0.110  -0.164  0.040 0.055 
log (number workers)    (0.132)  (0.186)  (0.221) (0.214) 
Capital     -0.031 0.055 0.233 0.230 0.243 
log (capital stock)     (0.122) (0.172) (0.196) (0.199) (0.194) 
Share of High Skilled         0.023 
log (share of employees with degree)         (0.072) 
Three digit sector controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Noise controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 
Firms 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on census production (ARD) and CEP management survey data. 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is energy expenditure over gross output. All columns include a full set of year binary indicators. "Management” is the 
average scores across the eighteen questions on management practices from the CEP management survey; output and factor input variables (labor, capital, materials, 
energy) are from the census production data (ARD). Column 3 introduces gross output to control for size. A potential issue is that instead of output in volume units, 
we only observe revenue. We therefore also include the other production factors in subsequent columns to correct for any possible scale effects. Noise controls are a 
set of variables capturing interview characteristics: duration and time of the interview, the gender of the interviewee, the reliability and competence of the interviewee 
as perceived by the interviewer and binary indicators for each interviewer. Standard errors clustered at the firm level (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form) are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
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column 8 suggests that at the sample mean of EE/GO (1.744) improving managerial practices from the 
25th to the 75th percentile (an increase in management of 0.840) is associated with a 17.4% reduction in 
energy intensity (βM×ΔM/(EE/GO) = -0.362 × 0.840 / 1.744% = -17.4%). Finally, in column 9 we 
include controls for skills, as an additional proxy for firm type. The negative correlation between 
energy intensity and management practices persists and continues to be significant. 
 
A number of concerns might arise with these results. First, our results imply nothing on the causality of 
the relationship between management and energy efficiency. It is quite possible this correlation is 
driven by other unobserved factors, for example that hiring management consultants helps to improve 
management practices and reduce energy usage. The evidence we have is merely suggestive, in that 
well managed firms appear to be robustly more energy efficient. As the first study of its kind to show 
this, we believe this is an interesting result in itself. We are also running field experiments in India to 
change the management practices of a randomly selected group of textiles firms to evaluate the causal 
impact of this on energy intensity. 
 
Second, because in our firm level data we do not have firm specific price information, our gross output 
measure captures both variations in actual output and variations in output price. Better managed firms 
might plausibly be able to charge higher prices for their products, increasing the mark-up and reducing 
factor cost-shares. In appendix C (Table C1) we therefore repeat the regressions from Table 3 using 
energy expenditure over variable costs (expenditure on labour and intermediates, VCOST) as our 
dependent variable. None of our results from Table 3 change in any fundamental way. To ensure that 
our results are driven by variations in energy expenditure rather than variation in the denominator (GO 
or VCOST), in Table C2 we also report similar regressions where we use (log) energy expenditure (log 
EE) as the dependent variable. In columns 1 and where we do not include any controls for firm size this 
leads to a positive and significant coefficient, because better managed firms are larger on average. With 
size controls from column 3 onward, the management coefficient turns significantly negative in line 
with our earlier results. Finally, we examine our results using log energy shares (Table C3). The main 
justification for using just energy shares in tables 2 and 3 is that such an approach is consistent with the 
popular translog factor estimation (Christensen, Jorgenson, Lau, 1971; Christensen, Greene, 1976). 
However, as it is evident from the table, this choice is not essential for our basic correlation between 
managerial practices and energy intensity. 
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3.3 Quantifying the Effect of Management on Energy Intensity 
While we can not interpret our results as causal, it is nevertheless interesting to explore their economic 
magnitude. For this purpose we conduct the following counterfactual experiment: what reduction in 
energy usage would occur if we increased managerial practices in a firm from the lowest to the top 
quartile, assuming that its energy intensity change in line with the sample average correlation? And in a 
similar spirit: what would be the resulting reduction in energy usage if the average UK firm – which 
has a very similar average management score to the average firm in Europe10 - were to experience an 
improvement in its management that would elevate it to the average US firm? 
 
Notice that we have no direct information on the greenhouse gas pollution. However, if we are willing 
to assume that there is a constant rate of carbon pollution associated with every unit spent on energy, 
then the percentage impact on pollution will be equal to the percentage impact on expenditure. 
 
We calculate the counterfactual percentage change in energy expenditure as follows: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛Δ=−
GO
EEM
EE
EEEE
M
CF
/β  
where EECF is the counterfactual energy expenditure. In other words, the percentage impact on energy 
expenditure is equal to the change in management quality times the coefficient on management in a 
factor share regression, divided by energy intensity. 
 
Table 4 reports the results from a number of counterfactual scenarios. The first scenario in row one 
considers the impact on energy intensity of moving from the bottom quartile management score (2.263) 
to the top quartile management score (3.894), an improvement of 1.631.  The coefficient on 
management from column 8 in Table 3 is βM = -0.362. Multiplying by the 1.631 management change 
and dividing by the bottom quartile energy intensity of 1.787% we get a one third reduction of energy 
expenditure, 33%.  Rows 2 to 3 report the results of similar calculations for the other two quartiles. 
Perhaps most interestingly is the implied aggregate effect on energy usage, calculated as the sum of the 
percentage change in energy expenditure (column 5) weighted by the share of energy consumption for 
                                                 
10 In the sample our UK average management score is 2.97 while the average across our firm sample from Europe (France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Sweden) is 2.98. 
  
Table 4 - Counterfactual Scenarios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  βM ∆M EE share EE/GO [%] (EECF-EE)/EE [%]
  
management 
coefficient 
change in 
management 
score 
share of 
aggregate 
energy 
consumption 
% energy 
expenditure 
over gross 
output 
% change in energy 
expenditure 
Moving from bottom 
quartile to top quartile -0.362 1.631 0.139 1.787 -33.040 
Moving from second 
quartile to top quartile -0.362 0.993 0.180 1.606 -22.383 
Moving from third quartile 
to top quartile -0.362 0.588 0.351 1.675 -12.708 
Moving UK average to 
equal US average -0.362 0.362   1.744 -7.514 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on census production (ARD) and CEP management survey data. 
Notes: The table reports results of the various counterfactual scenarios based on the results from Tables 1-3. The 
management coefficient in column 1 is taken from Table 3, column 8. Differences across quartiles in management scores 
and energy expenditure over gross output are taken from Table 1. Column 3 is based on energy expenditure values from 
Table 1.  Last column is calculated based on the formula provided in the text.  
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each quartile (column 3). Finally, in row 5 we examine the impact of a change in management quality 
corresponding to the average difference between the US and UK of ∆M = 0.362 on the average UK 
firm; i.e. an energy expenditure over gross output of 1.744%. This last scenario leads to a more modest 
7.5% reduction in energy expenditure, suggesting the improving the management practices of firms in 
the UK and Europe could be associated with reductions in energy intensity of 5% to 10%. 
 
3.4 Effect on other factors 
The analysis so far naturally raises questions about the factor intensity usage of other inputs: do better 
managed firms use all factor inputs less intensively, or substitute across different types of factor inputs? 
In summary, we find that better managed firms use less energy and materials, but a higher level of 
capital and (skilled) labor inputs.  
 
Table 5 examines this by reporting factor intensity results for materials, capital and labor. Columns 1 
and 2 report regressions of the intensity in intermediate inputs including energy, whereas columns 3 
and 4 exclude energy from intermediates. All materials input regressions yield significantly negative 
coefficient for management although the results without energy lead to somewhat lower (in absolute 
terms) and less significant point estimates. Better managed firms use less materials and less energy in 
their production process. Columns 5 and 6 report results for labor intensity (measured by the total wage 
bill) and 7 and 8 for capital intensity (measured by the stock of tangible fixed-assets)11. The results 
from these last four columns strongly indicate that better managed firms are more labor and capital 
intensive even when controlling for size by including (log) gross output.  This higher labour intensity 
appears to be due to a higher skill content of the workers, leading to a higher total wage bill.12  
 
                                                 
11 To compute cost shares for capital we would have to make assumptions about depreciation and interest rates to derive the 
user cost of capital. To avoid that we simply examine the ratio between capital stocks and output or costs. As it is not 
bounded between zero and one, as the cost shares, we report results in log terms. 
12 Across the sample of all 601 UK firms covered by the CEP management survey the correlations (and their p-value) 
between management and the log(% of employees with a degree) is 0.127 (0.003) and between management and the 
log(average wage) is 0.171 (0.000). The same figures for the full sample of 5,198 firms from all 12 countries in the survey 
are 0.2607 (0.000) and 0.309 (0.000). 
  
Table 5 - Factor Intensities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ME/GO ME/VCOST (ME-EE)/GO (ME-EE)/VCOST LE/GO LE/VCOST ln(K/GO) ln(K/VCOST) 
 
materials 
expenditure 
over gross 
output 
materials 
expenditure 
over variable 
costs 
materials 
minus energy 
expenditure 
over gross 
output 
materials minus 
energy expenditure 
over variable costs 
labor 
expenditure 
over gross 
output 
labor 
expenditure 
over variable 
costs 
capital 
expenditure 
over gross 
output 
capital 
expenditure 
over variable 
costs 
Management -2.849** -2.760** -2.488* -2.372* 1.642* 2.760** 0.147** 0.157*** 
 (1.447) (1.243) (1.454) (1.292) (0.973) (1.243) (0.058) (0.056) 
Gross output 2.703 6.871*** 3.039* 7.203*** -7.267*** -6.871*** -0.102** -0.087** 
log (gross output) (1.676) (1.478) (1.642) (1.470) (1.165) (1.478) (0.039) (0.038) 
Capital 1.250 -1.694 1.018 -1.912 2.563** 1.694   
log (capital stock) (1.607) (1.327) (1.596) (1.342) (1.010) (1.327)   
Three digit sector 
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Noise controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 
Firms 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on census production (ARD) and CEP management survey data. 
Notes: The table reports regressions of materials, labor and capital factor intensities. The dependent variable in the first six columns is multiplied by 100. Note that 
material and labour intensities are reported without logs which can be rationalised by a translog factor demand framework. For capital we only have a volume, but no 
expenditure index. Hence, capital over gross output is not bounded between zero and one and for that reason we report it in log terms. All columns include a full set of 
year binary indicators. "Management” is the average scores across the eighteen questions on management practices from the CEP management survey; output and factor 
input variables (labor, capital, materials, energy) are from the census production data (ARD). Noise controls are a set of variables capturing interview characteristics: 
duration and time of the interview, the gender of the interviewee, the reliability and competence of the interviewee as perceived by the interviewer and binary indicators 
for each interviewer. Standard errors clustered at the firm level (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) are reported in parenthesis below 
coefficients: *significant at 10%;**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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3.5 Effect on CO2 and energy quantity 
So far we implicitly assumed that energy prices do not vary systematically between firms after 
controlling for size, so that variations in energy expenditure intensity directly translate into variations 
in energy usage and pollution of the key greenhouse gas, CO2. For a highly integrated energy market 
such as the UK this does not seem unreasonable. Nevertheless in this section we provide some further 
evidence to support this assumption. Specifically, we confirm our key findings using quantity data on 
energy usage from the Quarterly Fuels Inquiry (QFI).13 The QFI is a survey run by the UK Office of 
National Statistics, which inquires about the usage of a variety of different fuels at the firm level. 
However, its sample size is about a tenth of the ARD used for the results above. As a result, the overlap 
between QFI and management survey data sample is fairly small with less than 300 observations. For 
this reason we did not use it for our main analysis, but it nevertheless provides a useful cross-validation 
of our main results. 
 
Table 6 contains the main QFI results. Column 1 looks simply at kWh of energy used and column 2 
looks at the ratio between kWh and gross output. In either case we find a significantly negative 
relationship with management, i.e. better management firms use less kWh of energy. Columns 3 and 4 
repeat the exercise with CO2 (we compute CO2 emissions on the basis of the quantity information on 
different fuel types and common conversion factors for the carbon content of fuels as reported in the 
appendix, table D1). Again we find a negative relationship, which is significant at the 10% level. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we match information that quantifies the firm-level managerial quality, following the 
methodology developed by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), to their establishment-level data in the UK 
census of production. Since the census data contains energy usage data, this allows us to undertake the 
first evaluation of the firm level association between management practices and energy intensity. We 
find a robust negative correlation between management practices and energy intensity. Better managed 
firms are more energy intensive, with the correlation substantial in magnitude – improving 
management levels from the 25th to the 75th percentile is associated with a 17.4% reduction in energy 
intensity. We also find a strong correlation between better management practices and establishment-
                                                 
13 For more details on the QFI see Martin (2005). 
 
Table 6 - Quantity measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ln(kWh) ln(kWh/GO) ln(CO2) ln(CO2/GO) 
  
log of kWh log of kWh over gross output 
log of carbon 
dioxide 
log of carbon 
dioxide over gross 
output 
Management -0.332** -0.332** -0.288* -0.288* 
 (0.159) (0.159) (0.149) (0.149) 
Gross output 0.067 -0.933*** 0.074 -0.926*** 
log (gross output) (0.052) (0.052) (0.047) (0.047) 
Capital 0.919*** 0.919*** 0.913*** 0.913*** 
log (capital stock) (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) 
Three digit sector 
controls yes yes yes yes 
Age controls yes yes yes yes 
Noise controls yes yes yes yes 
Region controls yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3857 3857 3857 3857 
Firms 1246 1246 1246 1246 
Observations with 
management data 286 286 286 286 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on census production (ARD), Quarterly Fuels Inquiry (QFI) and CEP 
management survey data.   
Notes: The table reports regressions of kWh and carbon dioxide used in production. These variables are based 
on data from the Quarterly Fuels Inquiry (QFI). To compute CO2 values on the basis of energy quantities we 
use the conversion factors reported in table D1 of the appendix. The QFI has a much smaller sample than the 
production census data (ARD). Hence, the intersection of all three datasets lead to a sample of only about 300 
firms. To identify all control variables we run all regressions on the full sample of firms with QFI information 
and include a dummy equal to one when the management information is missing. All columns include a full set 
of year binary indicators. "Management” is the average scores across the eighteen questions on management 
practices from the CEP management survey; output and factor input variables (labor, capital, materials, energy) 
are from the census production data (ARD). Noise controls are a set of variables capturing interview 
characteristics: duration and time of the interview, the gender of the interviewee, the reliability and competence 
of the interviewee as perceived by the interviewer and binary indicators for each interviewer. Standard errors 
clustered at the firm level (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) are reported in 
parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%;**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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level productivity, with a move from the 25th to 75th percentile of management associated with a 3.7% 
increase in total-factor productivity. 
 
These results suggest that management practices that are associated with improved productivity are not 
linked to worse environmental performance. Rather, is broadly supportive of the idea that well run 
firms use energy inputs more efficiently, thereby increasing profitability and productivity while at the 
same time reducing carbon emissions. Future research will seek to evaluate the causal nature of the 
relationship between management practices and energy intensity by using field experiments to 
randomly change management practices and evaluate its impact on energy intensity. 
 17
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APPENDIX A: DETAILS OF THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
TABLE A1: Full list of management practices with examples of the questions asked 
 
Practice Practice number 
Practice type Example of questions we asked 
    
Modern manufacturing, 
introduction 
1 Operations a) Can you describe the production process for me? 
b) What kinds of lean (modern) manufacturing processes have 
you introduced? Can you give me specific examples? 
c) How do you manage inventory levels? What is done to 
balance the line?  
 
Modern manufacturing, rationale 2 Operations a) Can you take through the rationale to introduce these 
processes? 
b) What factors led to the adoption of these lean (modern) 
management practices? 
 
Process documentation 3 Operations a) How would you go about improving the manufacturing 
process itself? 
b) How do problems typically get exposed and fixed? 
c) Talk me through the process for a recent problem. 
d) Do the staff ever suggest process improvements? 
 
Performance tracking 4 Monitoring a) Tell me how you track production performance? 
b) What kind of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) would 
you use for performance tracking? How frequently are 
these measured? Who gets to see this KPI data? 
c) If I were to walk through your factory could I tell how you 
were doing against your KPI’s? 
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Performance review 5 Monitoring a) How do you review your Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs)? 
b) Tell me about a recent meeting. Who is involved in these 
meetings? 
c) Who gets to see the results of this review? 
 
Performance dialogue 6 Monitoring a) How are these meetings structured? Tell me about your 
most recent meeting. 
b) During these meeting, how much useful data do you have? 
c) How useful do you find problem solving meetings? 
d) What type of feedback occurs in these meetings? 
 
Consequence management 7 Monitoring a) What happens if there is a part of the business (or a 
manager) who isn’t achieving agreed upon results? Can you 
give me a recent example? 
b) What kind of consequences would follow such an action? 
c) Are there are any parts of the business (or managers) that 
seem to repeatedly fail to carry out agreed actions? 
 
Target breadth 8 Targets a) What types of targets are set for the company? What are the 
goals for your plant? 
b) Tell me about the financial and non-financial goals? 
c) What do Company Head Quarters (CHQ) or their 
appropriate manager emphasize to you? 
 
Target interconnection 9 Targets a) What is the motivation behind your goals? 
b) How are these goals cascaded down to the individual 
workers? 
c) What are the goals of the top management team (do they 
even know what they are!)? 
d) How are your targets linked to company performance and 
their goals? 
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Target time horizon 10 Targets a) What kind of time scale are you looking at with your 
targets? 
b) How are long term goals linked to short term goals? 
c) Could you meet all your short-run goals but miss your long-
run goals? 
 
Targets are stretching 11 Targets a) How tough are your targets? Do you feel pushed by them? 
b) On average, how often would you say that you meet your 
targets? 
c) Are there any targets which are obviously too easy (will 
always be met) or too hard (will never be met)? 
d) Do you feel that on targets that all groups receive the same 
degree of difficulty? Do some groups get easy targets? 
 
Performance clarity and 
comparability 
12 Monitoring a) What are your targets (i.e. do they know them exactly)? 
Tell me about them in full. 
b) Does everyone know their targets? Does anyone complain 
that the targets are too complex? 
c) How do people know about their own performance 
compared to other people’s performance? 
 
Managing human capital 13 Targets a) Do senior managers discuss attracting and developing 
talented people? 
b) Do senior managers get any rewards for bringing in and 
keeping talented 
        people in the company? 
c) Can you tell me about the talented people you have 
developed within your team? Did you get any rewards for 
this? 
 
Rewarding high performance 14 Incentives a) How does you appraisal system work? Tell me about the 
most recent round? 
b) How does the bonus system work? 
c) Are there any non-financial rewards for top-performers? 
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Removing poor performers 15 Incentives a) If you had a worker who could not do his job what would 
you do? Could you give me a recent example? 
b) How long would underperformance be tolerated? 
c) Do you find any workers who lead a sort of charmed life? 
Do some individuals always just manage to avoid being 
fixed/fired? 
 
Promoting high performers 16 Incentives a) Can you rise up the company rapidly if you are really 
good? Are there any examples you can think of? 
b) What about poor performers – do they get promoted more 
slowly? Are there any examples you can think of? 
c) How would you identify and develop (i.e. train) your star 
performers? 
d) If two people both joined the company 5 years ago and one 
was much better than the other would he/she be promoted 
faster? 
 
Attracting human capital 17 Incentives a) What makes it distinctive to work at your company as 
opposed to your competitors? 
b) If you were trying to sell your firm to me how would you 
do this (get them to try to do this)? 
c) What don’t people like about working in your firm? 
 
Retaining human capital 18 Incentives a) If you had a star performer who wanted to leave what 
would the company do?  
b) Could you give me an example of a star performers being 
persuaded to stay after wanting to leave? 
c) Could you give me an example of a star performer who left 
the company without anyone trying to keep them? 
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APPENDIX B: MATCHING CENSUS TO FIRM-LEVEL DATA 
 
To combine the firm-level survey data with the ONS census data we rely on a lookup table 
provided by the ONS mapping from CRN (Ralf: explain these acronyms and include acronym in a 
parenthesis) to IDBR. However, this lookup table is not complete for three reasons. First, for some 
records the ONS relied on name matching, which often does not lead to results if different names or 
spellings are used. Second, because the CRN and IDBR system are maintained independently the 
same businesses is sometimes represented differently in either register. The IDBR identifies 
business units according to functional units, which are relevant for the computing of government 
statistics. A CRN number is created whenever a company’s management deems it necessary to 
register a new business name. Third, the lookup table is currently only provided for 2004. Hence, 
there is no match for businesses created after this date. Table B1 provides descriptive statistics 
comparing a number of key statistics between matched and non-matched companies. A plant is 
matched with higher probability if it is older, larger, better managed and also owned by a larger 
firm.  
We also subjected the data to a number of cleaning steps. Our key variables of interest in this study 
are factor expenditure and revenue shares. For a small number of firms factor revenue shares are 
either negative or larger than one (often several orders of magnitude larger). This is not consistent 
with any standard models of firm behaviour and likely a consequence of misreporting and 
measurement error; e.g. revenue being reported in 1000s and expenditure just in pound or vice 
versa. To avoid that our results are driven by any of this we firstly, we dropped establishments 
whose share of variable costs (materials plus labour cost) in gross output (VCOST/GO) was larger 
than one. We further dropped firms in the top and bottom percentile of the VCOST/GO distribution. 
Finally, we dropped establishments who had changes of more than 200 percent from year to year in 
VCOST/GO. Many of our results still go through even if we do not perform all of these steps. 
However, they ensure that things are more consistent; e.g. the dropping top and bottom percentiles 
is key for getting similar results when running either regressions of log factor shares or simply 
regression of factor shares. 
 
Table B1 - Descriptive statistics of the matched sample 
Variable Sample Obs Mean 
Employment at firm unmatched 263 444.45 
 matched 338 528.5*** 
Age unmatched 255 41.24 
 matched 337 45.53*** 
Employment at plant unmatched 250 389.93 
 matched 338 452.50*** 
Management Score unmatched 263 2.93 
  matched 338 3.04*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on census production (ARD) and CEP management survey data. 
Notes: The number of observations varies because of missing values for some variables for some firms. 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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APPENDIX C: FURTHER RESULTS 
 
 
Table C1 - Management Practices and Energy Expenditure over Variable Costs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Energy Expenditure over variable costs (EE/VCOST x 100) 
Management -0.265** -0.429** -0.356* -0.377** -0.402** -0.391* -0.388** -0.388** 
 (0.133) (0.173) (0.184) (0.184) (0.199) (0.199) (0.196) (0.196) 
Gross output   -0.137    -0.332* -0.333 
log (gross output)   (0.134)    (0.185) (0.232) 
Labor    -0.133  -0.187  0.002 
log (number workers)    (0.165)  (0.206)  (0.252) 
Capital     -0.043 0.055 0.218 0.218 
log (capital stock)     (0.154) (0.203) (0.238) (0.240) 
Three digit sector controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Noise controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 
Firms 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on census production (ARD) and CEP management survey data. 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is energy expenditure over variable costs (labor costs and materials expenditure). All columns include a full set of year 
binary indicators. "Management” is the average scores across the eighteen questions on management practices from the CEP management survey; output and factor input 
variables (labor, capital, materials, energy) are from the census production data (ARD). Column 3 introduces gross output to control for size. A potential issue is that instead 
of output in volume units, we only observe revenue. We therefore also include the other production factors in subsequent columns, to correct for any possible scale effects. 
Noise controls are a set of variables capturing interview characteristics: duration and time of the interview, the gender of the interviewee, the reliability and competence of the 
interviewee as perceived by the interviewer and binary indicators for each interviewer. Standard errors clustered at the firm level (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form) are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
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Table C2 - Management Practices and Energy Expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  log Energy Expenditure  (lnEE) 
Management 0.290*** 0.311*** -0.139* -0.078 -0.161* -0.194** -0.185** -0.197** 
 (0.105) (0.113) (0.077) (0.076) (0.086) (0.076) (0.080) (0.076) 
Gross output   0.848***    0.568*** 0.372*** 
log (gross output)   (0.054)    (0.102) (0.140) 
Labor    0.998***  0.544***  0.334*** 
log (number workers)    (0.067)  (0.077)  (0.125) 
Capital     0.758*** 0.470*** 0.311*** 0.289*** 
log (capital stock)     (0.052) (0.070) (0.102) (0.094) 
Three digit sector controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Noise controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 
Firms 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on census production (ARD) and CEP management survey data. 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the logarithm of energy expenditure. All columns include a full set of year binary indicators. "Management” is the average 
scores across the eighteen questions on management practices from the CEP management survey; output and factor input variables (labor, capital, materials, energy) are from 
the census production data (ARD). Column 3 introduces gross output to control for size. A potential issue is that instead of output in volume units, we only observe revenue. 
We therefore also include the other production factors in subsequent columns, to correct for any possible scale effects. Noise controls are a set of variables capturing 
interview characteristics: duration and time of the interview, the gender of the interviewee, the reliability and competence of the interviewee as perceived by the interviewer 
and binary indicators for each interviewer. Standard errors clustered at the firm level (i.e. robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) are reported in 
parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
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Table C3 - Management Practices and Log Energy Expenditure over Variable Costs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  log Energy Expenditure over Variable Costs (ln EE/VCOST) 
Management -0.193*** -0.204*** -0.132* -0.190** -0.186** -0.185** -0.170** -0.181** 
 (0.066) (0.072) (0.075) (0.081) (0.082) (0.083) (0.079) (0.076) 
Gross output   -0.137**    -0.372*** -0.544*** 
log (gross output)   (0.053)    (0.098) (0.134) 
Labor    -0.036  -0.015  0.293** 
log (number workers)    (0.063)  (0.090)  (0.121) 
Capital     -0.030 -0.022 0.263*** 0.243*** 
log (capital stock)     (0.053) (0.076) (0.099) (0.092) 
Three digit sector controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Age controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Noise controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046 
Firms 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on census production (ARD) and CEP management survey data.      
Notes: The dependent variable in the above regressions is the logarithm of the energy expenditure over variable costs (labor costs and materials expenditure). All columns 
include a full set of year binary indicators. "Management” is the average scores across the eighteen questions on management practices from the CEP management survey; 
output and factor input variables (labor, capital, materials, energy) are from the census production data (ARD). Column 3 introduces gross output to control for size. A 
potential issue is that instead of output in volume units, we only observe revenue. We therefore also include the other production factors in subsequent columns, to correct for 
any possible scale effects. Noise controls are a set of variables capturing interview characteristics: duration and time of the interview, the gender of the interviewee, the 
reliability and competence of the interviewee as perceived by the interviewer and binary indicators for each interviewer. Standard errors clustered at the firm level (i.e. robust 
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form) are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
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APPENDIX D: CONVERSION FACTORS 
Table D1 - Conversion Factors 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
Quantity 
units in raw 
data 
Conversion 
factor to 
kWh* 
Conversion 
factor to 
CO2** 
Oil Tonnes 11972.22 0.3 
Gas Oil Tonnes 12666.67 0.3 
LPG Tonnes 13722.22 0.3 
Coal Tonnes 7500 0.31 
Hard Coke Tonnes 8277.77 0.44 
Gas kWh 1 0.21 
Notes: *from DTI (2001); ** from Entech Utility Service Bureau 
(http://www.entech.co.uk/entech/ener_conv.htm) 
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